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INTRODUCTION

Nathan Fields, an African-American employee at the New York
State Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities
("OMRDD"), was in many ways the typical Title VIP employment
discrimination plaintiff, with a case that, on its face, suggested both
discriminatory and benign actions by his employer.2 For six years,3
1. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e (1994), prohibits discrimi
nation on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin by private and public em
ployers, labor organizations, and employment agencies. 1 LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION§ 1 .01 (2d ed. 2001). The statute reaches decisions related to hiring, firing,
promoting, classifying, and compensating employees, as well as employment conditions. Id.
2. Fields v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities, 115
F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 1997).
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Fields worked as a maintenance assistant in the electrical shop at
OMRDD's Oswald D. Heck Developmental Center ("Heck"). During
that time, he twice applied for a promotion, and on each occasion,
Heck selected white employees for the position.4 In addition, Fields
claimed that he was discriminatorily singled out for disciplinary treat
ment, that he was assigned to a disfavored work shift, and that he re
ceived fewer opportunities for overtime work than his white co
workers.5 Fields offered statistical evidence indicating that Heck dis
proportionately assigned the tedious and difficult "ballast" work to the
minority employees of the electrical shop.6 Fields's statistics also re
vealed that Heck did not randomly assign job pairings in the electrical
shop; rather, Heck tended to assign minorities to work with other mi
norities, while disparately matching white workers with other whites. 7
Finally, Fields testified that on two or three occasions he heard white
employees make racial jokes or slurs about minority co-workers.8
As is the case in many employment discrimination "disparate
treatment" claims,9 however, other facts - including Fields's spotty
employment record and Heck's ability to articulate legitimate, nondis
criminatory reasons for many of its actions - complicated the plain
tiff's claims. Fields himself acknowledged, for example, that he was
poorly qualified for the promotions, and that he had accumulated

3. Heck hired Fields as a Grade 8 maintenance assistant in 1985 and promoted him to
Grade 9 in 1986. Id. at 1 17. In 1989, Fields joined the Navy and went on military leave with
out pay from Heck. Id. Fields rejoined Heck's workforce in 1992, and he filed suit against his
employer i n May 1994. Id. at 1 17, 1 19. Fields's lawsuit related only to actions taken by his
employer after Fields's 1992 reinstatement. Id. at 1 17.
4. Id. at 1 18.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 119.
8. Id.
9. This Note deals solely with the type of employment discrimination cases commonly
termed "disparate treatment" claims, which are distinguished from "disparate impact" cases.
See lnt'I Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977) (employing
terminology of "disparate treatment" and "disparate impact"); Furnco Constr. Corp. v.
Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 581-82 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring) (same). In a disparate treat
ment claim, an individual plaintiff alleges that she was specifically injured by the defendant
employer's discriminatory conduct. See generally 1 LARSON, supra note 1, at § 1.09[1]. Dis
parate impact claims, by contrast, deal with employers' practices that, while neutral on their
face, disproportionately bar members of the plaintiff's class from a particular position or
from employment altogether. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See gener
ally 1 LARSON, supra, at § 1 .09[1]. If an employment practice or hiring device (such as a
seniority system or literacy test) is neither job related nor a business necessity, it may be
found discriminatory under a disparate impact analysis. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431, 436; 1
LARSON, supra, at § 1.09. Disparate impact claims often are brought as class actions, and
plaintiffs routinely use statistical evidence to show that the challenged employment practice
has a disparate effect on members of the protected class. See generally 1 LARSON, supra, at
§§ 1.09[1], 8.01[2].
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negative time, attendance, and performance records while at Heck. '0
In addition, Heck demonstrated that it assigned the tasks protested by
Fields largely on the basis of the different levels of experience and ex
pertise of each of its workers - not on the basis of the employees'
races.11 The jury agreed with the defendant's explanation, returning a
verdict in favor of Heck on all of Fields's claims, and the Second Cir
cuit affirmed the jury's verdict on appeal.12
An examination of Fields illustrates the many problems with the
current state of Title VII claims and the extent to which the Supreme
Court's artificial distinctions between different standards in this con
text have broken down. The trial judge in the case offered jury instruc
tions that were, according to the appellate court, "needlessly confus
ing."13 The judge informed the jury that the plaintiff could prevail
either (1) by proving that the defendant was animated by a "discrimi
natory motive," or (2) by proving both that Heck's stated reasons for
its actions were pretextual and that its real reasons were discrimina
tory.14 These separate prongs derive from two distinct strains of dispa
rate treatment law - what are termed "mixed-motive" and "pretext"
claims. Although the trial court's instructions were not completely ac
curate, the Second Circuit complicated the analysis even further by
blurring the lower court's two prongs. In order to understand how the
appellate court collapsed the two prongs, it is important first to ex
amine the source of the trial court's distinction.
The second half of the trial court's instruction in Fields derives
from the burden-shifting framework laid out by the Supreme Court in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.15 In an ordinary McDonnell
Douglas-Burdine case,16 the plaintiff first must make out a prima facie
case by showing that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she
was qualified for a job or promotion for which she applied; (3) she was
rejected; and (4) the position remained open or was filled by another
applicant.1 7 Once the plaintiff has established this prima facie case, the
burden shifts to the employer, who must articulate a legitimate, non10. Fields, 1 13 F.3d at 1 18.
11. Id. at 118-19.
12. Id. at 117, 119.
13. Id. at 121.
14. Id.
15. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
16. The Supreme Court reiterated the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case in Texas

Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), leading some courts and
scholars to refer to the burden-shifting scheme as the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine frame
work. E.g. , Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93
MICH. L. REV. 2229, 2232 (1995). This Note follows commentators like Malamud in refer
ring to the common framework for pretext claims as McDonnell Douglas-Burdine.
17. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53; see also McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
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discriminatory reason for the employment action.18 If the defendant
satisfies this burden, the plaintiff then must demonstrate that the de
fendant's proffered reason is pretextual, and that the actual motive for
its actions was discriminatory.19 The Court recently indicated that,
where the plaintiff has demonstrated pretext, the prima facie case it
self may be sufficient evidence' froin which the jury can infer that the
defendant's actual motivation was discriminatory.20
After the Court handed down its decision in 1973, McDonnell
Douglas-Burdine's burden-shifting framework dominated the land
scape of employment discrimination claims. In the 1980s, however, a
different form of analysis emerged, as lower courts held that discrimi
nation plaintiffs could establish a violation of Title VII by proving that
an unlawful motive had played some role in an employment decision.21
This analysis allowed plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case by
pointing to naked instances of discrimination without satisfying each
of the four prongs required to show pretext under McDonnell
Douglas-Burdine. When the circuits began to disagree over this new
proof structure, the Supreme Court sought to resolve the issue in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins22 - one of several notable Title VII cases
during the 1989 term.23
Price Waterhouse is central to this Note for two important reasons.
The decision not only recognized mixed-motive claims as a strand of
disparate treatment analysis separate from McDonnell Douglas
Burdine, but a concurring opinion also introduced the "direct evi
dence" requirement that has created considerable confusion ever
since. In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court faced a case in which
the employer had "mixed motives" for its challenged action - where,
in other words, both legitimate and discriminatory rationales moti18. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53.
19. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993).
20. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000). The Court
continued, however, to cite Hicks's focus on the ultimate question of discrimination, sug
gesting that plaintiffs should make an additional showing of discriminatory motives - or at
least rebut the defendant's legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation - rather than simply
rest on their prima facie case. See id.
21. See, e.g. , Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318 (8th Cir. 1985).
22. 490 U.S. 228 (1989)
23. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (holding that majority employees who were
not parties to a consent decree between an employer and minority employees are not barred
by res judicata effects from challenging employment decisions made under the consent de
cree); Lorance v. AT&T Techs. Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989) (holding that the triggering event
for a Title VII claim occurs when the employer engages in the allegedly discriminatory act,
not when an employee first feels its effect); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642
(1989) (holding that the burden of persuasion in a disparate impact claim rests always with
the plaintiff); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (holding that
§ 1981 protects against discrimination only in the making and enforcement, not the perform
ance, of contracts).
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vated its decision.24 In Justice Brennan's plurality opinion, the Court
held that the plaintiff bore the initial burden of showing that a dis
criminatory reason was a substantial or motivating factor in the em
ployment decision.25 If the plaintiff made this showing, the burden
then shifted to the employer to prove by a preponderance of the evi
dence that it would have made the same decision even if it had not re
lied on the unlawful factor (the so-called "same-decision" defense).26
Thus, simply stated, Price Waterhouse centrally held that the defen
dant in a mixed-motive case can avoid liability by prevailing on the
same-decision defense.
In retrospect, a concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse is perhaps
more notable than the plurality's holding. In her concurrence, Justice
O'Connor stated that plaintiffs in mixed-motive cases must present
"direct evidence" that the employer placed "substantial negative reli
ance on an illegitimate criterion" in reaching its decision.2 7 The lower
courts quickly latched on to Justice O'Connor's wording, and, despite
the fact that she offered little explanation of her terminology, the di
rect evidence standard became the touchstone of mixed-motive
cases.28
In the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("CRA"),29 Congress responded to
a handful of decisions from the Supreme Court's 1989 term, including
Price Waterhouse, that many advocates viewed as hostile to civil rights
- and specifically to victims of employment discrimination.30 Most
important for the purposes of this Note, the CRA states that any em
ployment decision in which a protected characteristic is a "motivating

24. 490 U.S. at 236-37. For a fuller discussion of Price Waterhouse, see infra Section I.A.
25. Id. at 241.
26. Id. at 242.
27. Id. at 276-77 ("In my view, in order to justify shifting the burden on the issue of cau
sation to the defendant, a disparate treatment plaintiff must show by direct evidence that an
illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the decision."). Justice O'Connor offered
only the following explanation in defining her direct evidence requirement:
(S]tray remarks in the workplace, while perhaps probative of sexual harassment, cannot jus
tify requiring the employer to prove that its hiring or promotion decisions were based on le
gitimate criteria. Nor can statements by nondecisionmakers, or statements by decisionmak
ers unrelated to the decisional process itself, suffice to satisfy the plaintiffs burden in this
regard.
Id. at 277 (internal citation omitted).
28. See Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, 199 F.3d 572, 581-82 (1st Cir. 1999) (compil
ing cases).
29. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered subsections of
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994)). Among other amendments, the CRA added §§ 703(m) and
706(g)(2)(B) to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat.
241, 253-66 (codified as amended principally at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-17 (1994)).
30. See supra note 23 (listing cases and summarizing holdings); see also infra notes 89-92
and accompanying text (discussing cases).
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factor" constitutes a violation of Title VIl.31 In contrast to Price
Waterhouse, the CRA does not exempt from liability employers who
succeed on the same-decision defense; it merely limits the damages
that can be levied against them.32 The legislators failed to specify,
however, whether they intended the CRA to embrace or abandon
Justice O'Connor's direct evidence standard for mixed-motive cases.33
The lower courts responded to the ambiguities of Justice
O'Connor's Price Waterhouse concurrence and the CRA by fixating
on the direct evidence standard. Although only Justice O'Connor and
the three dissenters agreed that plaintiffs must adduce direct evidence
in order to establish a mixed-motive claim, most circuits have followed
the minority in requiring direct evidence as· a threshold for mixed
motive claims.34 Since embracing this standard with near uniformity,
however, the courts have struggled to reach a common understanding
of direct evidence in assessing mixed-motive claims.
The circuit courts currently fall into three general schools of
thought with respect to the meaning of "direct evidence."35 The differ
ence among the separate camps is measured by the degree of circum-

31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994). This portion of the statute provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an unlawful employment practice is estab
lished when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also
motivated the practice.
Id.
32. Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (1994), a defendant found liable under § 2000e2(m) can limit its damages by showing that it would have made the same decision absent the
impermissible consideration. See infra notes 99-104 and accompanying text (providing the
text of the provisions and explaining the parties' burdens under the CRA).
33. See infra Section l.C.1 (discussing legislative history).
34. The Second Circuit noted the incongruity of adopting a requirement that a majority
of the Price Waterhouse Court did not endorse. Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d
1 176, 1 183 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Despite the inarguable fact that only four justices in Price Water
house would have imposed a 'direct evidence' requirement for 'mixed-motives' cases, most
circuits have engrafted this requirement into caselaw."). Nonetheless, "when no single ra
tionale commands a majority, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken
by those Members who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds.' " City of
Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 765 n.9 (1988) (internal citation omit
ted). In Price Waterhouse, Justice O'Connor concurred on narrower grounds than Justice
White, and her opinion therefore controls.
35. Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, 199 F.3d 572, 581-83 (1st Cir. 1999) (defining the
three camps and identifying the circuits that adopt each position). Michael A. Zubrensky
was the first commentator to note that the circuits generally fall into three camps on this is
sue. See Michael A. Zubrensky, Note, Despite the Smoke, There Is No Gun: Direct Evidence
Requirements in Mixed-Motives Employment Law After Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 46
STAN. L. REV. 959 (1994). Since Zubrensky examined the problem in 1994, the three-way
split has remained substantially the same, but the landscape has shifted, with circuit courts
jumping routinely from one position to another. Although this Note offers a brief summary
of the split as it currently stands, the lesson to be drawn from the circuit split is not the dif
ferent approaches that the courts have adopted, but simply the degree to which the mixed
motive doctrine has created confusion among the lower courts.
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stantial evidence that the courts allow to satisfy the direct evidence re
quirement. The first school, sometimes termed the "classic" position,
is the strictest in its definition of direct evidence.3 6 These courts re
quire mixed-motive plaintiffs to present evidence that suffices to
prove, without inference, presumption, or consideration of other evi
dence, that a discriminatory animus motivated the defendant em
ployer in the challenged employment decision.37 The second camp,
called the "animus plus" position, is somewhat more generous to
plaintiffs. These courts hold that direct evidence includes statements
or conduct by the employer that directly reflect the alleged discrimina
tory animus, and that relate precisely to the employment decision at
issue.38 Under this approach, the required evidence may be either di
rect or circumstantial.39 Finally, the third school, or "animus" position,
requires only direct or circumstantial evidence that shows a discrimi
natory animus.40 Unlike the animus-plus school, this approach does
not require that the evidence bear squarely on the particular employ
ment decision at issue.41
The distinction between pretext claims - those that ask the jury to
infer discrimination through the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine frame
work - and mixed-motive claims - those that invoke Price
Waterhouse by presenting direct evidence of discrimination - only
exacerbates the confusion regarding the direct evidence requirement.
Because plaintiffs are unsure whether the evidence they have pro
duced is "direct" enough to satisfy the particular court, they often seek

36. Fernandes, 199 F.3d at 582.
37. Id. The Fifth Circuit adopts this view, see, e.g. , Mooney v. Aramco Servs. Co., 54
F.3d 1207, 1217 (5th Cir. 1995); Brown v. E. Miss. Elec. Power Ass'n, 989 F.2d 858, 861 (5th
Cir. 1993), as do the Tenth, see, e.g. , Shorter v. ICG Holdings, Inc., 188 F.3d 1204, 1207 (10th
Cir. 1999); EEOC v. Wiltel, Inc., 81 F.3d 1508, 1514 (10th Cir. 1996), and Eleventh Circuits,
see, e.g. , Carter v. Three Springs Residential Treatment, 132 F.3d 635, 641 (11th Cir. 1998);
Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1 181, 1189 (11th Cir. 1997). But see Wright v. South
land Corp., 187 F.3d 1287, 1303-04 (11th Cir. 1999) (permitting inference).
38. Fernandes, 199 F.3d at 582.
39. Id. The Third, see, e.g. , Walden v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 126 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1074 (1998), Fourth, see, e.g. , Taylor v. Va. Union Univ., 193
F.3d 219, 232 (4th Cir. 1999) (en bane), Seventh, see, e.g., Sheehan v. Donlen Corp., 173 F.3d
1039, 1044 (7th Cir. 1999), Eighth, see, e.g., Deneed v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 431,
436 (8th Cir. 1998); Thomas v. First Nat'l Bank of Wynne, 111 F.3d 64, 66 (8th Cir. 1997),
and District of Columbia Circuits, see, e.g. , Thomas v. Nat'l Football League Players Ass'n,
131 F.3d 198, 204 (D.C. Cir. 1997), all at one point have endorsed the animus-plus position.
40. Fernandes, 199 F.3d at 582.
41. Id. The Second Circuit falls in this category, see, e.g. , Lightfoot v. Union Carbide
Corp., 110 F.3d 898, 913 (2d Cir. 1997); Ostrowski v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Cos., 968 F.2d 171,
182 (2d Cir. 1992), and the Seventh, see, e.g. , Hennessy v. Penril Datacomm Networks, Inc.,
69 F.3d 1344, 1348-50 (7th Cir. 1995), and Eleventh Circuits, see, e.g. , Wright, 187 F.3d at
1303-04, have also shown intermittent approval of this approach.
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to instruct the jury on both pretext and mixed-motive claims.42 In this
way, if the evidence is held to be indirect, the plaintiff can still fall
back on the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine analysis. These dual instruc
tions, however, are complex, and they serve only to confuse the jury.
Thus, because of the pretext/mixed-motive distinction - and because
of the direct evidence muddle - the law of disparate treatment claims
has become, as one commentator aptly stated, a "swamp" that makes
little sense to plaintiffs, employers, academics, or the courts.43
The Second Circuit's opinion in Fields illustrates the depth of this
quagmire. After losing on his race discrimination claim against Heck
at the trial court level, Fields appealed the court's jury instructions, ar
guing that the CRA had abolished the distinction between pretext and
mixed-motive instructions.44 The Second Circuit, however, rejected
this contention, holding that the legislative history did not support
Fields's interpretation.45 In a footnote, the court stated that mixed
motive instructions, which it termed "dual motivation" charges, differ
from pretext instructions, or "substantial motivation" charges, only in
one respect: the defendant's affirmative defense that it would have
made the same decision absent the impermissible consideration.46 In
other words, under both McDonnell Douglas-Burdine and the CRA,
the jury determines whether a discriminatory rationale was a moti
vating factor in the employer's adverse employment action.47 A mixed
motive plaintiff then faces the additional hurdle of the defendant's
same-decision defense. Requesting a mixed-motive instruction is sim-

42. See Rose v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., No. 00-7599, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 15794, at
*17 (2d Cir. July 16, 2001) ("[A] plaintiff may request a Price Waterhouse charge based on
evidence of a forbidden motive even when she attempts to show that all of the employer's
non-discriminatory explanations are pretextual."); Thomas, 131 F.3d at 202 ("The plaintiff
often will - quite reasonably - argue both alternatives."); HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR., CIVIL
RIGHTS & EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 243 (1997); cf George Rutherglen, Recon
sidering Burdens of Proof' Ideology, Evidence, and Intent in Individual Claims of Employ
ment Discrimination, 1 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 43, 65 (1993) (explaining that the issues in
pretext and mixed motivation cases are so similar that "it is difficult to imagine a case that
presents one but not the other"; in such cases, "there is little in the way of legal doctrine that
saves the jury from confusing instructions on the arcane distinction between pretext and
mixed motivation"); Michael J. Zimmer, The Emerging Uniform Structure of Disparate
Treatment Discrimination Litigation, 30 GA. L. REV. 563, 603-04 (1996) (stating that, if the
dichotomy continues to exist, "judges will be hard pressed to create jury instructions that
make sense") (hereinafter Zimmer, Emerging Uniform Structure).
43. Robert Belton, Mixed-Motive Cases in Employment Discrimination Law Revisited:
A Brief Updated View of the Swamp, 5 1 MERCER L. REV. 651 (2000).
44. Fields v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities, 115
F.3d 1 16, 123 (2d Cir. 1997).

45. Id. at 124.
46. Id. at 124 n.4.
47. See id.
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ply "shorthand," the court said, for requesting an additional instruc
tion concerning the same-decision defense.48
As the following discussion illustrates, Congress and the Price
Waterhouse Court thought they lowered the McDonnell Douglas
Burdine bar by allowing a class of discrimination plaintiffs to bypass
the complex burden-shifting scheme and jump straight to the "moti
vating factor" test. Stated differently, where a plaintiff could demon
strate discriminatory animus without relying on an inference from pre
text, Congress intended to enable her to establish the defendant's
liability simply by showing that the animus was a motivating factor in
the employer's decision. Fields frustrates this effort by compressing
the complex McDonnell Douglas-Burdine scheme into a simple moti
vating factor test49 while leaving an additional obstacle - the same
decision defense - in the path of mixed-motive plaintiffs. The result is
a paradox that directly contradicts congressional intent.
Even as it insists that the CRA did not erase the distinction be
tween pretext and mixed-motive claims, the Fields court nonetheless
uses the motivating factor analysis to inform its understanding of indeed, to simplify - McDonnell Douglas-Burdine pretext claims.
With pretext and mixed-motive claims now measured in the Second
Circuit by the same motivating factor standard, Fields concludes that
only mixed-motive plaintiffs, not pretext plaintiffs, must overcome a
same-decision showing by the defendant. Thus, although Congress in
tended to use the motivating factor test to make discrimination claims
easier for mixed-motive plaintiffs,5° Fields actually makes it easier for
plaintiffs to succeed in pretext cases than in mixed-motive cases. The
Second Circuit is hardly to blame for this absurd development, since it
was merely trapped on the tortuous path forged by the Court, by
Congress, and by other lower courts. Thus far, the Court has made no
effort to clear the muddle, leaving parties, attorneys, judges, and juries
hopelessly confused.51
This Note argues that courts should jettison their efforts to under
stand the arcane pretext/mixed-motive distinction and should focus in48. Id.
49. According to the Fields court, a pretext instruction simply asks the jury whether an
impermissible reason was a motivating factor in the employment decision. See supra text ac
companying notes 46-47.
50. See infra text accompanying note 94; cf. Christopher Y. Chen, Note, Rethinking the
Direct Evidence Requirement: A Suggested Approach in Analyzing Mixed-Motives Discrimi
nation Claims, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 907 (2001) ("Price Waterhouse is significant . . . be
cause it potentially affords plaintiffs more favorable standards of liability." (internal foot
note omitted)).
51. See Kaighn Smith, How Do We Work This? Making Sense of the Liability Standard
in "Disparate Treatment" Employment Discrimination Cases, MAINE BAR J., Jan. 1999, 34,
37 ("If all this seems unwieldy to lawyers, consider the problems in fashioning comprehensi
ble instructions for juries. As the courts struggle to make the law coherent, appellate chal
lenges to jury instructions have become commonplace.").
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stead on the question at the heart of every discrimination case: the
motives of the employer.52 Part I discusses the Court's decision in
Price Waterhouse, then turns to the plain language of the CRA to ar
gue that the statute's text requires abandoning the pretext/mixed
motive distinction. Part I also examines the legislative history of the
CRA and concludes that, because Congress's intent is highly ambigu
ous, the text of the statute best guides courts' understandings of the
Act. Part II proposes a set of jury instructions consistent with the spirit
of McDonnell Douglas-Burdine and the text of the CRA. These in
structions clear the mixed-motive muddle for juries and make the par
ties' task in employment discrimination cases more apparent from the
outset. Part II explains that these instructions are grounded in the text
of Title VII, and that they represent an extension of efforts by courts
and scholars to simplify this area of the law. By making this inquiry
the touchstone for analyzing individual disparate treatment claims,
courts can devise a simple standard that allows parties on both sides of
the employment relationship to conform their behavior with the law.
I.

MAKING (NON)SENSE OF IT ALL:
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991

PRICE WATERHOUSE AND

The ordered chaos that surrounds mixed-motive claims and indi
vidual disparate treatment law in general is in large part attributable
to the ambiguous language of the Supreme Court and Congress. Sec
tion I.A examines the Supreme Court's splintered opinion in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins,53 with particular attention to the plurality
opinion by Justice Brennan and Justice O'Connor's concurrence. Sec
tion LB then considers Congress's reaction to the decision in the
CRA, looking first to the plain language of the statute for guidance in
understanding its meaning. Section LB argues that fidelity to the text
of the CRA commands abandoning the obscure pretext/mixed-motive
52. Many commentators have grappled with the direct evidence requirement, the
pretext/mixed-motive distinction, and the difficulties of instructing a jury given the confused
state of employment law. See, e.g., Belton, supra note 43; Susan Bisom-Rapp, Of Motives
and Maleness: A Critical View of Mixed Motive Doctrine in Title Vil Sex Discrimination
Cases, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 1029 (1995); Kenneth R. Davis, The Stumbling Three-Step,
Burden-Shifting Approach in Employment Discrimination Cases, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 703
(1995); Rutherglen, supra note 42; Smith, supra note 51, at 34; Michael J. Zimmer, Pretext
and Mixed Motive After the 1991 Act, N.J. L.J., Dec. 5, 1994, at 11 [hereinafter Zimmer, Pre
text and Mixed Motive]; Chen, supra note 50; Kelley E. Dowd, Casenote, The Correct Appli
cation of the Evidentiary Standard in Title VII Mixed-Motive Cases: Stacks v. Southwestern
Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1095 (1995); Steven M. Tindall, Note, Do as
She Does, Not as She Says: The Shortcomings of Justice O'Connor's Direct Evidence Re
quirement in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 332 (1996);
Joseph J. Ward, Note, A Call for Price Waterhouse II: The Legacy ofJustice O'Connor's Di
rect Evidence Requirement for Mixed-Motive Employment Discrimination Claims, 61 ALB. L.
REV. 627 (1997); Zubrensky, supra note 35.
53. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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distinction in favor of the test laid out by the statute. Finally, Section
1.C searches the legislative history of the 1991 Act for some expression
of Congress's intent, ultimately finding no clear legislative intention.
Part I concludes that, in the absence of an unambiguous legislative in
tent to the contrary, the controlling test in this area should derive from
the statute's plain language.

A. Price Waterhouse, Mixed Motives, and the Direct Evidence
Requirement
The Supreme Court's decision in Price Waterhouse crystallized the
distinction between pretext and mixed-motive claims under Title VII.
Section I.A examines the decision and provides a context for
Congress's reaction to the case two years later in the CRA. This Sec
tion reveals that a majority of the Court did not agree that direct evi
dence should be the touchstone in mixed-motive cases, and that the
opinion provides little guidance for the lower courts.
The facts of Price Waterhouse illustrate the dual motivations that
typically exist in mixed-motive claims. Ann Hopkins had worked for
five years at Price Waterhouse's Office of Government Services when
she was nominated for partnership.s4 Hopkins was highly qualified for
the position: other partners in the office described her as "an out
standing professional" with "strong character, independence, and in
tegrity," and they praised her "key role" in landing a multimillion
dollar contract with the State Department.ss But Hopkins's co-workers
sometimes perceived her aggressive style as abrasive and brusque, and
even the partners who supported her candidacy admitted that she was
sometimes impatient and unduly harsh.s6
As the Price Waterhouse plurality noted, however, there were signs
that some partners reacted negatively to Hopkins's aggressive person
ality because she was a woman.s 7 Some of the partners, for example,
felt that she "overcompensated for being a woman" by acting "ma
cho," and that she needed to take "a course at charm school."s8 As a
result, the Policy Board placed Hopkins's candidacy on hold, advising
her that to improve her chances she should "walk more femininely,
talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her
hair styled, and wear jewelry."s9
54. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 233.
55. Id. at 234.
56. Id. at 234-35.
57. Id. at 235; cf Bisom-Rapp, supra note 52, at 1041-42.
58. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235.
59. Id.
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In assessing Hopkins's discrimination claim, Justice Brennan,
writing for the four-justice plurality, began by examining the language
of Title VII, which prohibits employers from discriminating against
any individual "because of" his or her race, color, religion, sex, or na
tional origin.60 Justice Brennan concluded that the "because of" lan
guage means that sex "must be irrelevant to employment decisions."61
In other words, Title VII condemns even those employment decisions
that are based on legitimate considerations if an impermissible factor
was also considered.62
Given that a Title VII violation exists whenever the employer has
considered a protected characteristic, the plurality then laid out its
two-part mixed-motive analysis. First, the plaintiff must show that the
protected characteristic - in Price Waterhouse, sex - "played a moti
vating part" in the challenged employment decision.63 Once the plain
tiff discharges this burden, the employer can present an affirmative de
fense and "avoid a finding of liability only by proving that it would
have made the same decision even if it had not allowed gender to play
such a role."64 Thus, this affirmative defense, which has come to be
called the "same-decision defense,"65 allows the employer to escape
liability altogether by showing that leaving the unlawful variable out
of the equation would not have changed the final outcome.
The plurality opinion made clear that plaintiffs retain a degree of
flexibility in bringing mixed-motive claims. Justice Brennan stated in a
footnote that a plaintiff's case need not be pigeonholed from the be
ginning as either a pretext or a mixed-motives case.66 Rather, the dis
trict court can wait until some point after discovery before it decides,
based on all the evidence presented, whether the case involves mixed
motives.6 7 Justice Brennan also indicated that he saw no meaningful

60. Id. at 239; see also 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-2(a) (1994).
61. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240.
62. Id. at 241.
63. Id. at 244.
64. Id. at 244-45. The plurality borrowed this framework from Mt. Healthy City Board of
Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 286-87 (1977), where the Court held that once a plaintiff
has shown that an exercise of a First Amendment liberty was a "substantial" or "motivating
factor" in an adverse employment decision, the employer must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that it would have reached the same decision in the absence of such protected
conduct. This framework has also been employed by the Court in the context of protected
labor conduct, see NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983), and where unconsti
tutional motives allegedly contributed to the enactment of legislation, see Arlington Heights
v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). Pointing to these previous cases, Justice
Brennan concluded that mixed-motive analysis constitutes "a well-worn path." Price
Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250.
65. See infra note 103 and accompanying text ..
66. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 247 n.12.
67. Id.
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difference between the level of proof required by the plurality and
that required by Justice O'Connor.68 Responding to Justice
O'Connor's concurrence, which required direct evidence of discrimi
nation to trigger the mixed-motive analysis, the plurality noted that it
was not suggesting "a limitation on the possible ways of proving that
stereotyping played a motivating role in an employment decision." 69
Justice Brennan also refrained from deciding "which specific facts,
'standing alone,' would or would not establish a plaintiff's case . . . ." 70
In other words, the plurality declined to limit the nature of proof re
quired in mixed-motive cases to "direct evidence," but instead left
available to plaintiffs a range of evidence that could be adduced to
support an employee's case.
Justice White's concurrence71 reveals that a majority of the Price
Waterhouse Court - the four-justice plurality and Justice White did not require direct evidence in order to trigger mixed-motive analy
sis.72 In Justice White's view, the Court should simply look to Mt.
Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle,73 which employed a "sub
stantial" or "motivating factor" test, in devising a mixed-motive test
for the employment context. His concurrence made no reference to
the nature of evidence required of the plaintiff. Justice White did,
however, state that a broad range of evidence could be introduced by
the defendant in proving the same-decision defense, indicating that he
did not wish to restrict parties in employment discrimination cases to
certain types of evidence. 74
Like Justice White, Justice O'Connor agreed with the plurality that
the burden of persuasion should shift to the employer to make out a
same-decision defense.75 Justice O'Connor noted that the mixed-

68. Id. at 250 n.13.
69. Id. at 251-52.
70. Id. at 252.
71. Id. at 258-61 (White, J., concurring).
72. See Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1183 (2d Cir. 1992) ("The re
quirement of 'direct evidence' was not . . . adopted either by the plurality of four or by Jus
tice White, so there was not majority support for this proposition."). But see supra note 34.
73. 429 U.S. 247, 287 (1977). Mt. Healthy applied the mixed-motive framework to em
ployment decisions motivated by an employee's exercise of his or her First Amendment
rights. See supra note 64 (explaining the application of the mixed-motive analysis in various
contexts).
74. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 260-61 (White, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 261 (O'Connor, J., concurring). This Note does not aim to provide a detailed
analysis of Justice O'Connor's concurrence; other commentators have exhaustively com
pleted this task. For the most thorough account, see Tindall, supra note 52. See also Ward ,
supra note 52; Zubrensky, supra note 35. Rather, this Note briefly summarizes Justice
O'Connor's concurrence in order to shed light on the fact that the lower courts have incor
rectly applied the direct evidence requirement, converting mixed-motive analysis into a
quagmire that most plaintiffs opt to circumvent.
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motive framework laid out by the Court should be considered a "sup
plement" to the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine burden-shifting
scheme.76 Employing slightly different rhetoric from the plurality, Jus
tice O'Connor stated that once the plaintiff has established that a dis
criminatory animus was a "substantial factor" in its decision, the de
fendant may be required to show that "despite the smoke, there is no
fire."77 In other words, the plaintiff cannot simply infer a discrimina
tory animus from "discrimination in the air."78 Instead, the plaintiff
must, as in a tort case, show causation - that the defendant's imper
missible consideration of a protected characteristic proximately caused
the adverse employment decision.79
Justice O'Connor departed from the plurality, however, in requir
ing a specific nature of evidence in mixed-motive cases. In her view,
the plaintiff must present "direct evidence" that an impermissible con
sideration was a substantial factor in the employer's decision in order
to shift the burden to the defendant.80 Justice O'Connor explained that
the "strong showing of illicit motivation" she would require could not
consist merely of "stray remarks in the workplace" or "statements by
decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional process itself. "81 Beyond
this negative definition, however, Justice O'Connor offered no precise
delineation of her "direct evidence" terminology.
The direct evidence requirement perplexes the lower courts, who
inconsistently apply it.82 Few can decipher precisely what Justice
O'Connor meant by "direct evidence," and a handful are not certain
that such a requirement should exist at all.83 Some commentators have
suggested, after closely examining the facts in Price Waterhouse, that
76. Id. Thus, a majority of the Court agreed in Price Waterhouse that the mixed-motive
analysis was distinct from the more familiar McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework.
77. Id. at 266.
78. Id. at 251 (plurality opinion) (quoting an expression used by the petitioner, Price
Waterhouse).
79. Id. at 266 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 276.
81. Id. at 276, 277.
82. Justice Kennedy, in a dissent joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia,
presciently predicted, " [t)oday the Court manipulates existing and complex rules for em
ployment discrimination cases in a way certain to result in confusion." Price Waterhouse, 490
U.S. 228, 279 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). He added: "Courts will also be required to
make the often subtle and difficult distinction between 'direct' and 'indirect' or 'circumstan
tial evidence. Lower courts long have had difficulty applying McDonnell Douglas and
Burdine. Addition of a second burden-shifting mechanism . . . is not likely to lend clarity to
the process." Id. at 291. The dissenters argued that the existing McDonnell Douglas frame
work could adequately accommodate mixed-motive claims such as Hopkins's without creat
ing a new burden-shifting structure. See id. at 286-87.
83. See, e.g., Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1 176, 1 183 (2d Cir. 1992) ("The
requirement of 'direct evidence' was not . . . adopted either by the plurality or by Justice
White, so there was not majority support for this proposition."). But see supra note 34.
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Justice O'Connor did not mean "direct evidence" in the traditional,
strict meaning of the term,84 but rather implied a broader connotation
of the term that includes circumstantial evidence tied closely to the ac
tual employment decision in question.BS Regardless of what Justice
O'Connor meant by "direct evidence,'' Price Waterhouse remains rife
with ambiguity.B6 Thus, Section I.B proposes abandoning the decision's
unclear language in favor of a more straightforward text - the CRA.
B.

The Plain Language of the Civil Rights Act

This Section recommends avoiding the muddle created in Price
Waterhouse by adhering to Congress's plain language. It begins by de
scribing the events that prompted enactment of the CRA and then
analyzes the text itse1f.B7 It concludes by offering the CRA's legislative
history as a justification for textual fidelity.
1.

The 1991 Act: Congress Responds to the Supreme Court

The Civil Rights Act of 1991 was largely Congress's response to a
handful of 1989 Supreme Court decisions that the civil rights commu
nity viewed as hostile to employment discrimination plaintiffs.BB In
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,B9 for example, the Court altered
disparate impact analysis and retreated from the "business necessity"
requirement.90 And in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,91 the Court
84. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 577 (7th ed. 1999) ("Evidence that is based on per
sonal knowledge or observation and that, if true, proves a fact without inference or presump
tion."). But see JOHN H. WIGMORE, A STUDENTS' TEXTBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
40 (1935) (explaining that the term "has no utility" because it is "sometimes used to mean
testimonial evidence in general, but sometimes also limited to apply only to testimony di
rectly asserting the fact-in-issue").
85. See Tindall, supra note 52, at 354 ("From the clues in her opinion, it seems that when
Justice O'Connor required direct evidence she meant evidence of a decisionmaker's words
that show animus toward the plaintiff's protected class which is related to the adverse em
ployment decision."). This comports more with the reading adopted by the courts in the
animus-plus camp than with the classic view. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
86. Cf. Thomas v. Nat'! Football League Players Ass'n, 131 F.3d 198, 203 (D.C. Cir.
1997) ("As an initial matter, it should be noted that Justice O'Connor's concurrence was one
of six votes supporting the Court's judgment . . . so that it is far from clear that Justice
O'Connor's opinion, in which no other Justice joined, should be taken as establishing prece
dent. Justice White's concurring opinion makes no mention of 'direct' evidence, nor does the
plurality opinion written by Justice Brennan." (citations omitted)).
87. See generally William N. Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 621
(1990) ("The statute's text is the most important consideration in statutory interpretation,
and a clear text ought to be given effect.").
88. See supra note 23 (citing cases and stating holdings).
89. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
90. Prior to Wards Cove, the burden of persuasion in disparate impact cases, see supra
note 9, rested initially with the plaintiff. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431
(1971). Once the plaintiff proved that a disparate impact was caused by a facially neutral
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held that § 1981, which protects against racial discrimination in the
making and enforcement of contracts, does not bar discrimination in
the performance of contracts.92
Congress reacted quickly to these decisions. Within a year, legisla
tors introduced the Civil Rights Act of 1990, which they termed an
"omnibus legislative response to judicial interpretations of Title
VII." 93 One of the Act's chief purposes was to "respond to the
Supreme Court's recent decisions by restoring the civil rights protec
tions that were dramatically limited by those decisions."94 With these
statements, Congress expressly declared that Price Waterhouse and its
companion decisions motivated the legislation.
Despite its rapid start, the proposed bill quickly became controver
sial, and passage proved difficult.95 The business community in par
ticular launched a stiff resistance to the legislation, and President Bush
vetoed the first 1990 version of the bill.96 After Congress incorporated
the compromise provisions demanded by the White House,9 7 President
Bush signed the legislation, which went into effect in 1991.98

employment device, the burden shifted to the defendant to show that the challenged practice
was both job related and a business necessity - i.e., that the device was essential for the em
ployer to be able to identify qualified employees. Id. Wards Cove altered this analysis by
holding that the burden of persuasion remains at all times with the plaintiff. 490 U.S. at 659.
Wards Cove also weakened the business necessity requirement, stating that "there is no re
quirement that the challenged practice be 'essential' or 'indispensable' to the employer's
business to pass muster." Id. Congress abrogated Wards Cove and reinstated the Griggs
standard in the CRA. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A) (1994).
91. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
92. See id. at 171. Section 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994), protects the right to make and
enforce contracts without discrimination on the basis of race or ancestry. See LARSON, supra
note 1, at § 101.01. Civil rights activists viewed Patterson as particularly pernicious because
of the effect it had among the lower courts, which interpreted the decision to mean that any
conduct by the employer after the formation of the contract - including termination and
retaliation - could not be covered by § 1981. See, e.g. , McCarthy v. Kemper Life Ins. Co.,
924 F.2d 683, 688 (7th Cir. 1991); Hayes v. Cmty. Gen. Osteopathic Hosp., 940 F.2d 54, 56
(3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1060 (1992); see also LARSON, supra note 1, at
§ 101.01 (4].
93. CHARLES DALE, LEGAL ANALYSIS OF S.2104 AND H.R. 4000: THE 'CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT OF 1990' (1990).
94. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-856, at 1 (1990).
95. See DAVID A. CATHCART ET AL., THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991 2 (1993).
96. 136 CONG. REC. 31,827-28 (1990) (reprinting President Bush's veto message, which
cited concerns about hiring quotas as the primary reason for vetoing the legislation).
97. CATHCART ET AL., supra note 95, at 14-15, state that the chief area of compromise
in the 1991 Act was the provisions related to disparate impact claims and Wards Cove.
98. See THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF 1991: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY i (Douglas s. McDowell
ed., 1992). Because much of the text of the proposed 1990 Act remained intact in the en
acted CRA of 1991 - and because the debate over the two bills encompassed many of the
same issues - this Note treats the legislative history of the 1990 Act as relevant to, and in
deed part of, the history of the 1991 Act. See CHARLES DALE, H.R.l, THE 'CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT OF 1991,' THE ADMINISTRATION'S CIVIL RIGHTS BILL (H.R. 1375 AND S.611), AND
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The CRA instituted a number of major reforms in employment
discrimination law. Most notably, the Act made jury trials and com
pensatory and punitive damages available for claims of alleged inten
tional discrimination under Title VII and the Americans with Disabili
ties Act.99 The Act also overturned Wards Cove, establishing that
when a plaintiff proves that an employment practice has a disparate
impact on a protected class, the employer must show that the practice
is both job related and a business necessity.100 The CRA also over
turned Patterson by amending § 1981 to prohibit racial discrimination
in the performance of contracts.101 Congress responded to Price
Waterhouse in two principal portions of the CRA, which the following
Section examines.
2.

The Text

Two provisions of the 1991 Act stand at the center of this Note.
First, § 2000e-2(m) (the "motivating factor provision") codifies the
motivating factor test that a majority of the Price Waterhouse Court
endorsed:
Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an unlawful employ
ment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates
that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor
for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated
the practice.1 02

This section of the statute makes clear that an employer violates Title
VII whenever it considers an illicit reason in its decision process, irre
spective of whether it would have made the same decision absent the
illegal consideration. In this respect, the CRA substantially comports
with Price Waterhouse's holding.
The Act goes on, however, to depart from Price Waterhouse in not
allowing employers to escape entirely from liability by explaining that
they would have made the same decision absent the impermissible
consideration. Under § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (the "same-decision provi
sion"),103 if the defendant succeeds on the same-decision defense, the
THE FINAL CONFERENCE VERSION OF S.2104 OF THE lOlST CONGRESS: A LEGAL
ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON ( 1 991 ).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 1 981 (b)-(c) (1994). Such relief had previously been available only to vic
tims of racial and ethnic discrimination under § 1 981. Thus, prior to the CRA, Title VII af
forded victims of sex discrimination only equitable relief. See CATHCART ET AL., supra note
95, at 2.
100. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1994).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (proscribing discrimination in the "making, performance,
modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges,
terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship").
102. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994).
103. The same-decision provision provides:
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plaintiff is not entitled to reinstatement, back pay, or compensatory or
punitive damages. A plaintiff who has successfully shown liability un
der the motivating factor provision, however, does receive declaratory
and injunctive relief, as well as attorneys' fees and costs, regardless of
the defendant's success on the same-decision defense.'04 Thus, while
Congress essentially ratified Price Waterhouse's structure with respect
to the plaintiff's burden in establishing the defendant's liability, it
overturned the decision to the extent that it allowed employers com
pletely to escape liability with the affirmative defense.
In the task of statutory construction, many judges and scholars
hold that the text, not the illusory intent of the legislature, controls in
terpretation.105 At its broadest level, the "textualist" approach follows
the maxim of Oliver Wendell Holmes, who wrote, "[w]e do not in
quire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute
means."106 Although this quotable passage expresses the sentiment of
textualists generally, it does not accurately reflect the views of all who
claim that a statute's text is paramount in its interpretation.
Long before Justice Antonin Scalia's views rose to prominence,
courts practiced a fidelity to statutes' language that some scholars now
term "traditional" textualism.107 Under the traditional approach, a
statute's "plain meaning" governed "its interpretation, unless negated
by strongly contradictory legislative history."108 In other words, where
a statute was unambiguous, the court followed its plain meaning. In
the event of ambiguous language, however, legislative history could
control the decision.109 Indeed, legislative history could even trump
statutory language that appeared on its face to be plainly to the con
trary.110

On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under section 2000e-2(m) of this title
and a respondent demonstrates that the respondent would have taken the same action in the
absence of the impermissible motivating factor, the court (i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as provided in clause (ii)), and
attorney's fees and costs demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the pursuit of a
claim under section 2000e-2(m) of this title; and
(ii) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any admission, reinstatement,
hiring, promotion, or payment . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
104. Id.; see also CATHCART ET AL., supra note 95, at 31 (1993).
105. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAW 14-41 (1997). See generally Eskridge, supra note 87 (discussing the textualist
approach).
106. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV.
417, 419 (1899).
107. See, e.g. , Eskridge, supra note 87, at 624.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 624, 628.
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Justice Scalia's views on statutory interpretation largely supplanted
the traditional textualist approach with his elevation to the Supreme
Court in the late 1980s. Professor Eskridge, who charts Justice Scalia's
rejection of the "old" textualism in the Justice's early Supreme Court
opinions, terms the nascent approach "new textualism."111 The new
textualism begins with the premise that "[t]he text is the law, and it is
the text that must be observed."112 In Justice Scalia's view, the putative
legislative intent is not as important as what the statutory language it
self means.113 A statute's legislative history, he claims, should not be
the dispositive signal of the statute's meaning, because the legislature
is a body of individual lawmakers who cannot share a collective in
tent.114 Indeed, in most instances, no legislative intent exists at all, be
cause few of the legislators gave any thought to the particular issue in
question.115
Instead of attempting to divine meaning from the actions of inde
pendently minded legislators, then, the new textualists maintain that
the interpreter of a statute should focus on the context of the legisla
tion and the meaning that the statute's language carried at the time it
was enacted.116 The new textualists also strive to accord their reading
of a statute with the surrounding body of law in which it is located.11 7
The new textualists deviate from the statutory language only when
"literally" interpreting the statute would produce "an absurd, and
perhaps unconstitutional, result."118 Stated differently, the new textu1 1 1. Id. at 623.
1 12. SCALIA, supra note 105, at 22.
1 13. See id. at 23.
114. See id. at 29-30, 32; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in
Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59, 60 (1988) ("Congress votes on the
bill, not on the reports. No one can vote against a report, and the President cannot veto the
language of a report."); Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Govern
mental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 438 (1996) ("Consider
that each legislator possesses a complex mix of hopes, expectations, beliefs, and attitudes. It
is not obvious which of these mental states, or combination of them, constitutes her essential
intent for legislation.").
115. SCALIA, supra note 105, at 32 ("[W]ith respect to 99.99 percent of the issues of con
struction reaching the courts, there is no legislative intent," because, "[f]or a virtual cer
tainty, the majority was blissfully unaware of the existence of the issue, much less had any
preference as to how it should be resolved.").
1 16. See SCALIA, supra note 105, at 37; see also Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490
U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
1 17. Green, 490 U.S. at 528; see also Jeffrey 0. Cooper, Interpreting the Americans with
Disabilities Act: The Trials of Textualism and the Practical Limits of Practical Reason, 74
TUL. L. REV. 1207, 1212 (2000) ("[T]he statutory text itself may contain inconsistencies and
ambiguities that require resolution. But for the textualist, such difficulties are resolved
through careful consideration of the statutory structure as a whole and the relationship be
tween the particular statutory provision and the rest of the legislatively enacted code." (in
ternal citations omitted)).
1 1 8. Green, 490 U.S. at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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alists look to a statute's legislative history only when its plain language
suggests a strangled meaning that the legislature could not have
meant, either as a matter of common sense or as a matter of constitu
tional principles.119
This Note argues that both modes of interpretation - the tradi
tional and the new textualism - command an approach to disparate
treatment claims that the courts have not followed. The new textual
ists, of course, would look to the CRA's text and no further, unless the
resulting understanding of the statute was preposterous or unconstitu
tional. According to the plain language of the motivating factor provi
sion, an employer violates Title VII anytime it allows a protected
characteristic to serve as a "motivating factor" in an employment deci
sion. The text draws no distinction between direct and circumstantial
evidence, or between pretext and mixed-motive claims. Rather, it
speaks in plain terms, suggesting that a motivating factor test controls
all discrimination claims. Thus, reading the CRA's provisions as cre
ating a uniform approach to disparate treatment claims - a motivat
ing factor test - is neither absurd nor unconstitutional.
At least one court to have contemplated the possibility that the
text of the CRA erases the pretext/mixed-motive distinction, however,
disagrees with this conclusion. In Watson v. Southeastern Pennsylvania
Transportation Authority,120 the Third Circuit considered both the text
and the legislative history of the 1991 Act and concluded that the Act
did not erase the pretext/mixed-motive distinction. The Watson court
began its analysis by examining the text of the motivating factor provi
sion, which it read as a reaction to Price Waterhouse.121 The court
noted that the section prohibits any employment decision in which a
protected characteristic was a motivating factor, "even though other
factors also motivated this practice."122 The quoted language, the
Watson court stated, suggests that Congress intended to target specifi
cally those cases in which multiple factors motivated the defendant
1 1 9. Cf Stephen M. Gill, Comment, The Perfect Textualist Statute: Interpreting the Per
manent Resident Alien Provision of28 U.S. C. § 1332, 75 TUL. L. REV. 481, 500-01 (2000).
To be sure, the textualist approach is not without its critics. See generally Ronald
Dworkin, Comment, in SCALIA, supra note 105, at 1 15; Mary Ann Glendon, Comment, in
SCALIA, supra note 105, at 95; Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, in SCALIA, supra note 105, at
65. Some empirical evidence suggests that the new textualism simply does not work as
promised. See, e.g., James P. Nehf, Textualism in the Lower Courts: Lessons from Judges In
terpreting Consumer Legislation, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 39-109 (1994); George H. Taylor, Tex
tualism at Work, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 259, 319-80 (1995). Others simply suggest that the no
tion of a textualist approach is conceptually impossible. See Paul E. McGreal, There is No
Such Thing as Textualism: A Case Study in Constitutional Method, 69 FORDHAM L. REV.
2393 (2001). Although this Note recognizes the force of these criticisms, it nonetheless ad
heres to the text of the CRA for the reasons articulated above.
120. 207 F.3d 207 (3d Cir. 2000).
121. Watson, 207 F.3d at 217.
122. 41 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994).
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(i.e., mixed-motive cases); otherwise, it simply would have spoken in
broad terms without bothering to insert the superfluous language.123
The court also stated that the use of the term "demonstrates" in the
motivating factor provision correlates with Justice O'Connor's use of
the same term in her Price Waterhouse concurrence - a correlation
too close to be coincidental.124
The Watson court offered further support for its conclusion that
the pretext/mixed-motive distinction remains intact after the CRA.
Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (the same-decision provision) limits the
damages available against a defendant that, though liable under the
motivating factor provision, can show it would have reached the same
decision absent the impermissible consideration.125 The Third Circuit
in Watson noted that § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)'s affirmative defense is avail
able only where the defendant is liable under the motivating factor
provision - not under § 2000e-2(a), the general disparate treatment
provision that defines unlawful employment practices by employers.126
If Congress intended to create a new standard of causation for all in
dividual disparate claims, the court reasoned, it would have drafted
the same-decision provision to apply to all such cases, not simply those
under the motivating factor provision.127 Thus, because claims under
the motivating factor provision entail their own special defense, they
must differ inherently from claims under the general disparate treat
ment provision.
The conclusions in Watson, though insightful, do not undermine
the new textualist reasoning this Note adopts. The Watson court sug
gested that Congress intended in the CRA to address only those cases
in which multiple factors, not just a discriminatory animus, motivated
the employer, suggesting that the bulk of cases would still fall under
the general disparate treatment provision (§ 2000e-2(a)). In the mod
ern workplace, however, an employer is rarely motivated solely by a
discriminatory impulse. Rather, an amalgam of factors, both conscious
123. Watson, 207 F.3d at 2 17.
1 24. Id. Justice O'Connor used the word "demonstrates" throughout her opinion. E.g. ,
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 275 ( 1 989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (charac
terizing case as one in which "the employee has demonstrated by direct evidence that an il
legitimate factor played a substantial role"); id. at 276-77 ("[The employer] must demon
strate that with the illegitimate factor removed from the calculus, sufficient business reasons
would have induced it to take the same employment action."). The Watson court called these
passages "key portions" of Justice O'Connor's opinion, Watson, 207 F.3d at 217, but in the
places where she stated her central holding, Justice O'Connor used different terminology.
See, e.g. , Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 278 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Under my ap
proach, the plaintiff must produce evidence sufficient to show that an illegitimate criterion
was a substantial factor . . . . " (emphasis added)). Thus, the Third Circuit's analysis is
strained.
125. See supra note 103 (quoting the text of § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)).
126. Watson, 207 F.3d at 218.
127. Id.
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and unconscious, often explains a discriminatory employment deci
sion.128 The CRA may simply recognize that it is increasingly difficult
for plaintiffs to show that a discriminatory animus was the singular
reason for their dismissal (or nonpromotion, etc.). Rather than sup
planting the general disparate treatment provision, then, Congress
supplemented that provision with one that recognizes the evolving na
ture of discrimination cases. The old provision remains available for
plaintiffs who choose to use it, but the new one can be used by both
"pretext" and "mixed-motive" plaintiffs.
From the new textualist perspective, the principal problem with
Watson is that the court attempted to discern Congress's intent from
the language it used rather than examining the language on its own
terms. On its face, the motivating factor provision does not limit itself
to mixed-motive cases; it simply includes cases where multiple factors
motivated the employer.129 And although new textualists look to the
structure of a statute to determine whether a reading of its language is
excessively strained, the Watson court's structural arguments do not
defeat this Note's textualist reading. The fact that the same-decision
defense is attached only to the motivating factor provision and not to
the general disparate treatment provision means nothing. If Congress
anticipated that the motivating factor provision would be used princi
pally by mixed-motive plaintiffs, then it logically would have attached
the same-decision defense only to that provision, rather than also al
tering the general disparate treatment provision. That legislative deci
sion by no means requires that § 2000e-2(m) be used exclusively by
mixed-motive plaintiffs. Thus, the Watson court's arguments do not
sufficiently demonstrate that reading the CRA as creating a uniform
motivating factor standard for all disparate treatment claims is some
how absurd or unconstitutional.
This Note does not stop, however, with a new textualist interpreta
tion. Good sense counsels that, in addition to the plain text, a glance at

128. See, e.g., Bisom-Rapp, supra note 52, at 1039 (recognizing "the causal relationship
between the legitimate and discriminatory motives" and explaining that "fact finders may
have difficulty seeing that the discriminatory motive may indeed have directly contributed to
the 'legitimate' motive, where the latter is, for example, the deterioration of the plaintiff's
performance"). Some scholars, including Bisom-Rapp, have suggested that the causal rela
tionship between "legitimate" and "discriminatory" motives merits jettisoning an intent
based approach to discrimination claims. Bisom-Rapp, supra, at 1()40 (recommending the
abandonment of the same-decision text in favor of an approach that examines overall evi
dence of discrimination, irrespective of employer claims); see also Linda Hamilton Krieger,
The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal
Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1 161, 1161-66 (1995) (arguing that current dis
parate treatment theory is inadequate because it assumes that discrimination is motivational,
rather than cognitive, in origin).
129. For the language of the motivating factor provision, see supra text accompanying
note 102.
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legislative history may occasionally be merited.13° Thus, this Note also
employs the methods of traditional textualism, considering the lan
guage of the CRA in light of its history in order to determine, if possi
ble, Congress's intentions in enacting the statute. As the following
Section indicates, the ambiguity of this legislative history provides ad
ditional support for abiding by the plain language of the CRA.
C.

Legislative History of the Civil Rights Act

According to the traditional textualist approach, unless the history
of the CRA points in another direction, the text of the statute sets
forth a simple motivating factor test that controls all Title VII individ
ual disparate treatment claims. This Section turns to that history in or
der to determine the changes Congress intended to effect in enacting
the motivating factor provision. In light of the decidedly ambiguous
legislative history, this Section concludes that the textualist reading
outlined above, which does not include the direct evidence require
ment, is not inconsistent with Congress's intent. The Section next con
siders Congress's intentions with respect to the continued distinction
between pretext and mixed-motive claims, again concluding that the
vague statutory history does not preclude elimination of the distinc
tion.
1.

Legislative History of the Direct Evidence Requirement

An examination of the legislative history of the CRA reveals that
Congress was largely silent regarding Justice O'Connor's direct evi
dence requirement. That silence, however, is not the only puzzling as
pect of the statute's history. Although the CRA headlined the legisla
tive agenda in 1990 and 1991, little traditional legislative history
accompanies the Act.131 As was the case with the original passage of
Title VII in 1964, the 1991 Act was a quickly adopted compromise that
followed extended debate over prior drafts, with few committee
hearings or reports and little floor debate on the final version.132
130. See, e.g., Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 710 (1962) ("The decisions of this
Court have repeatedly warned against the dangers of an approach to statutory construction
which confines itself to the bare words of a statute, for 'literalness may strangle meaning.' "
(citations omitted)).
131. See CATHCART ET AL., supra note 95, at 7.
132. See id. Cathcart explains that three primary sources of legislative history exist for
the CRA: (1) the CRA of 1 990; (2) various interpretative memoranda entered into the
Congressional Record by Senators and Representatives; and (3) a three-paragraph Interpre
tive Memorandum entered by Senator Danforth, providing, " [n]o statements other than the
interpretive memorandum . . . shall be considered legislative history of, or relied upon in any
way as legislative history in construing or applying, any provision of this Act that relates to
Wards Cove
Business necessity/cumulation/alternative practice." Id. at 7-8 (quoting 137
CONG. REC. S15276 (Oct. 25, 1991) (Interpretive Memorandum)).
-
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Moreover, the legislative history that does exist focuses heavily on
provisions of the Act not pertinent to this Note, with less attention
paid to Price Waterhouse and the provision that affects it
§ 2000e2(m). In those areas in which the legislators discuss mixed-motive
analysis, they mention a requirement of direct evidence only once, and
that cursory remark is hardly dispositive. As a result, combing the leg
islative history to discern Congress's intent regarding direct evidence
becomes largely a task of inference from silence.133
Although the legislators failed to articulate precisely what kind of
evidence they would require of mixed-motive plaintiffs, the legislative
history suggests that they did not intend for the requirement to be as
stringent as some circuits have demanded. In the Conference Report
accompanying the 1990 Act, the Conferees expressed their intention
"to restore the rule applied by the majority of circuits prior to the
Price Waterhouse decision that any discrimination that is actually
shown to play a role in a contested employment decision may be the
subject of liability."134 The Conferees went on to state:
-

Conduct or statements are relevant under this test only if the plaintiff
shows a nexus between the conduct or statements and the employment
decision at issue. For example, isolated or stray remarks not shown, un
der the standards generally applied for weighing the sufficiency of evi
dence, to have motivated the employment decision at issue are not suffi
cient.135

This "stray remarks" language seems to mirror Justice O'Connor's
negative definition of direct evidence,136 indicating that Congress may
have intended to codify such a requirement in the motivating factor
provision. Some courts, however, also hold that stray remarks are in
sufficient proof of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas
Burdine model.13 7 Thus, the Conferees may simply have intended to
require the same nature of proof in all employment discrimination
cases, without setting a higher standard in cases under the motivating
factor provision than existed under McDonnell Douglas-Burdine.

133. Other commentators have noted Congress's silence - or at least its ambiguity regarding the direct evidence requirement under the CRA. See, e.g. , Davis, supra note 52, at
750-51 ("Nothing in the statute or its legislative history suggests that a plaintiff cannot rely
on circumstantial evidence to show that discrimination motivated the employer. A plaintiff
may offer all proof of discriminatory intent, whether direct or circumstantial, under the mo
tivating factor test of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.").
134. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-856, at 18-19 (1990).
135. Id.
136. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("[S]tray remarks in the workplace, while perhaps probative of sexual harassment, cannot
justify requiring the employer to prove that its hiring or promotion decisions were based on
legitimate criteria." (internal citation omitted)).
137. Malamud, supra note 16, at 2324.
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Contrary evidence in the record suggests that Congress considered
the direct evidence requirement and, in its silence, tacitly incorporated
Justice O'Connor's standard. During Senate hearings, Eleanor
Holmes Norton - testifying as a Georgetown University law profes
sor and the former chair of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission - responded to critics of the legislation who claimed the
Act would punish employers for mere thoughts. Norton argued that
"[t]he notion that title VII ever allowed thoughts as evidence is a sur
prise . . . . There must be direct evidence of discrimination . . . . [A]t
least one . . . piece of that direct evidence may have been the motivat
ing factor."138 Following her statement, Norton and the Committee
Chair, Senator Edward Kennedy, engaged in the following exchange:
THE CHAIRMAN: So your reading as well as those of the responses is
we're not talking about thoughts, we are talking about motivating fac
tors.

Ms.

NORTON: There has to be direct evidence of a motivating factor.

Thoughts are no more evidence in a mixed-motive case than they are in a
single-motive case.
THE CHAIRMAN: All right.139

As opaque as this passage appears, one could argue that Norton's tes
timony at least provided notice to the legislators that plaintiffs bring
ing suit under the new statute would be required to adduce direct evi
dence.
For a variety of reasons, however, Norton's statements do not indi
cate a congressional intent to codify Justice O'Connor's direct evi
dence requirement. First, it is not at all clear from her remarks what
Norton meant by "direct evidence," because she, like Justice
O'Connor, failed to define the term. Indeed, it is probable that the
Professor, like the lower courts, had no clear understanding of Justice
O'Connor's terminology, and that she was merely invoking the par
lance that had gained favor among the lower courts.140 Second, Senator
Kennedy's apparent acquiescence to Norton's explanation of the di
rect evidence requirement does not indicate that he understood what
the requirement meant - much less that he intended to codify it into
law. Rather, taken in context, Senator Kennedy's response is best un1 38. Civil Rights Act of 1990: Hearings on S. 2104 Before the Committee on Labor and
Human Resources, lOlst Cong. 251, 171 (1990) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of
Professor Eleanor Holmes Norton).
139. Id. at 172.
140. It is worth noting that Norton's testimony - and the Senate Hearings in general followed soon after Price Waterhouse was handed down. It may be safe to assume that at this
time the lower courts had not had sufficient opportunity to engraft the direct evidence re
quirement into case law. Rather, Norton was likely referring to the direct evidence standard
that some courts had required in mixed-motive cases before Price Waterhouse was decided.
E.g., Terbovitz v. Fiscal Ct. of Adair County, Ky., 825 F.2d 111, 1 15-16 (6th Cir. 1987).
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derstood as signaling satisfaction with Norton's rebuttal of the argu
ment that the statute would police thoughts. The Chairman's own
comments in separate portions of the legislative history give no hint
that he - or, for that matter, any of his colleagues - intended to
codify the direct evidence requirement.141 Professor Norton's remarks
thus provide little support for any finding of congressional intent.
Several factors may explain Congress's failure explicitly to address
the nature of proof that plaintiffs must adduce to trigger the motivat
ing factor provision. First, although Price Waterhouse was one of the
major cases of the Supreme Court's 1989 term that Congress targeted
in the CRA, the legislators devoted more of their energies to other
portions of the statute.142 It is entirely feasible that the legislators
chose to allocate more of their time and political resources to the
amendments related, for example, to the availability of jury trials un
der Title VIl143 or the burdens of proof in disparate treatment cases144
than to obscure language in Justice O'Connor's concurrence.
A second possible explanation for the congressional silence on the
issue of direct evidence is that the legislators were more concerned
with the allocation of liability under Price Waterhouse than they were
with methods of proof. Congress's primary aim in overturning the
Court's decision was to ensure that remedies remain available to
plaintiffs even where the employer succeeds on the same-decision de
fense.145 In other words, Congress had no desire to tamper with the
burden-shifting structure of mixed-motive claims made available by
Price Waterhouse; it simply wanted to expand the availability of relief.
Because the plurality's decision with respect to shifting burdens satis
fied the legislators, they saw no need to address the nature-of-proof
requirement.
141. In his opening statement, for example, Senator Kennedy remarked that an em
ployee is entitled to relief when he or she "demonstrates that prejudice actually motivated
an employment decision." Hearings, supra note 138, at 102. The Senator later added that:
the burden falls on the plaintiff to show that a discriminatory motivation actually contrib

uted - was a motivating factor

-

prove it. If they aren't able to prove

in the decision, and has to demonstrate that and has to
it, then we are not dealing with what this particular pro

vision provided. They have to prove it.

Id. at 1 16. Nowhere did the Chairman mention the nature of proof that the bill required.
142. See CATHCART ET AL., supra note 95, at 14-15 (explaining that the section of the
statute related to disparate impact and business necessity attracted the bulk of the legisla
tors' attention).
143. Cf. id. at 9 (arguing that the CRA's introduction of jury trials is perhaps its "most
significant aspect," because it "fundamentally changes the legal model underlying federal
employment discrimination Jaws").
144. See id. at 14-15 ("No other section of the Act generated as much controversy and
attracted as much attention as that which addresses the Supreme Court's decision in Wards
Cove . . . . [T]he measures relating to the disparate impact analysis formed the basis for prot
estations from the Bush Administration." (citations omitted)).
145. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 101-856, at 18 (1990); see also Hearings, supra note 138,
at 102 (opening statement of Sen. Kennedy).
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Finally, it is possible that the direct evidence requirement simply
had not gained common currency by the time Congress drafted the
motivating factor provision. The motivating factor provision was
drafted as part of the doomed Civil Rights Act of 1990, and its lan
guage, with only one exception,146 remained largely intact in the 1991
Act. Thus, the portion of the Act dealing with mixed-motive claims
was drafted rather soon after Price Waterhouse was handed down in
the summer of 1989. At the time, it may not have been foreseeable except, perhaps, to Professor Norton - that the courts would engraft
the direct evidence requirement into the case law.14 7
Given the silence in the legislative history on the matter of direct
evidence, Congress likely gave little thought to Justice O'Connor's
concurrence. This Note concludes that the legislators assumed that
plaintiffs bringing suit under the motivating factor provision would be
able to adduce both direct and circumstantial evidence in proving their
case.148 The following Section reveals that, like the legislative history
regarding the direct evidence requirement, the record concerning the
continued distinction between pretext and mixed-motive claims suffers
from a marked vagueness. Both areas of confusion, therefore, should
be clarified by reference to the plain language of the statute.
2.

Legislative Intent and the Pretext/Mixed-Motive Distinction

Although commentators have read some lower court decisions as
ruling that the CRA erased the confusing distinction between pretext
claims under McDonnell Douglas-Burdine and mixed-motive claims,149

146. As drafted, the CRA of 1990 initially prohibited any decision in which a protected
characteristic was a "contributing factor." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-755, at 4 (1990). Even
tually the legislators replaced "contributing factor" with "motivating factor." H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 101-856, at 4 (1990).
147. See supra note 140.
148. Other commentators have reached this conclusion. See Davis, supra note 52, at 75051 ("Nothing in the statute or its legislative history suggests that a plaintiff cannot rely on
circumstantial evidence to show that discrimination motivated the employer. A plaintiff may
offer all proof of discriminatory intent, whether direct or circumstantial, under the motivat
ing factor test of the Civil Rights Act of 1991."); Harold S. Lewis, The Civil Rights Act of
1991 and the Continued Dominance of the Disparate Treatment Conception of Equality, 1 1
ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L . REV. 1 , 10 (1992) ("Whether plaintiff's initial proof takes the form of
'direct' anecdotal testimony of discriminatory motive; substantial . . . evidence . . . ; or simply
the more common 'inferential' formula, the employer must demonstrate 'that it would have
taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor' . . . . " (citations
omitted)).
149. Karen A. Haase, Mixed Metaphors: Model Civil Jury Instructions for Title VJ/ Dis
parate Treatment Claims, 76 NEB. L. REV. 900, 918 (1997), cites O'Day v. McDonnell
Douglas Helicopter Co., 79 F.3d 756, 761 (9th Cir. 1996), and Allen v. City of Athens, 937 F.
Supp. 1531 (N.D. Ala. 1996), as holding that the 1991 Act eliminated the pretext/mixed
motive distinction. But a close reading reveals that Haase misapprehends these cases. In the
O'Day passage cited by Haase, the court makes clear that it is discussing only mixed-motive
claims, O 'Day, 79 F.3d at 760-61, and the Allen court separately assessed the plaintiff's evi-
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no circuit has clearly and consistently held that the Act had such an
effect. This Note argues that the plain language of the statute can be
read as having eliminated the division between pretext and mixed
motive - a conclusion that the legislative history does not preclude.
Some circuit courts, however, disagree with this assessment.150 Section
l.B.2 above refuted the text-based arguments in Watson v. Southeast
ern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority,151 which held that the dis
tinction remains intact after the CRA.152 This Section considers that
decision's holding regarding the pretext/mixed-motive distinction and
demonstrates that the court's analysis does not mandate the conclu
sion drawn in that case.
In addition to its textual analysis, the Watson court examined the
legislative history of the CRA and concluded that Congress intended
to preserve the division between pretext and mixed-motive claims.
The court cited various portions of the congressional reports and
hearings indicating that the motivating factor provision's primary pur
pose was to overturn Price Waterhouse's liability holding.153 In support
of its interpretation, the court cited dicta in Landgraf v. US! Film
Products,154 where the Supreme Court stated that the motivating factor
provision responds to Price Waterhouse "by setting forth standards
applicable in 'mixed motive' cases."155 Additionally, the Watson court
concluded that interpreting the CRA as eliminating the confusing dis
tinction would not simplify employment discrimination law,156 noting
that other tests, such as the "determinative factor" standard in Title
VII retaliation cases, would continue to exist in different contexts.
The legislative history arguments in Watson are weak at best. The
court's finding that the motivating factor provision was conceived pri
marily as a response to Price Waterhouse is sound; the legislative his
tory is unambiguous on this point.15 7 Simply because Congress in
tended for the provision to overturn Price Waterhouse in the mixeddence under McDonnell Douglas and § 2000e-2(m), the motivating factor provision, Allen,
937 F. Supp. at 1545.
150. See, e.g., Fields v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Retardation & Developmental Dis
abilities, 115 F.3d 1 16, 124 (2d Cir. 1997) ("[T]he distinction between 'dual motivation' and
'substantial motivation' jury instructions survives the 1991 Act."); Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d
1 137, 1143 (4th Cir. 1995) ("Section 107 was intended to benefit plaintiffs in mixed-motive
cases; it has nothing to say about the analysis in pretext cases such as this one.").
151. 207 F.3d 207 (3d Cir. 2000).
152. See supra notes 120-130 and accompanying text.
153. Watson, 207 F.3d at 218-19.
154. 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
155. Id. at 251.
156. Watson, 207 F.3d at 220.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 134-135 (citing congressional language ex
pressing an intent to overturn Price Waterhouse).
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motive context, however, does not mean that it wished for the moti
vating factor test to be available only to mixed-motive plaintiffs. In
other words, Congress may have contemplated that the motivating
factor provision, while targeted primarily at Price Waterhouse, would
have broader implications.158 Moreover, most courts and scholars who
have considered the issue disagree with the Watson court's conclusion
that eliminating the distinction would not simplify employment dis
crimination law.159 Juries seem better equipped to apply separate tests
for discrete claims - for example, motivating factor for a race dis
crimination claim and determining factor for an accompanying retalia
tion claim - than to consider different standards - i.e., McDonnell
Douglas-Burdine and the motivating factor provision - for the same
claim.160
By now the irony should be clear: the lower federal courts gleaned
a direct evidence requirement from a single concurring opinion in a
case that Congress expressly rejected, and they subsequently grafted
that requirement onto the very statutory provision that overturned the
decision. Based on an analysis of the statute's text and legislative his
tory, this Part concludes that courts should turn to the text of the stat
ute as their touchstone in resolving the considerable confusion sur
rounding individual employment discrimination claims. Part II carries
that textualist analysis a step further in seeking to clarify the current
law for practitioners and courts.
II.

NAVIGATING THE "SWAMP" IN PRACTICE:

TOWARD COMPREHENSIVE - AND COMPREHENSIBLE - JURY
INSTRUCTIONS

Individual employment discrimination law currently manifests two
heads - pretext and mixed-motive - that emanate from the same
body of law - Title VII. This Part returns to that body of law to
fashion a set of jury instructions that can be used in all individual dis
parate treatment cases, regardless of whether the claim would tradi
tionally have been classified as pretext or mixed-motive. Section II.A
then explains that the proposed model instructions are supported by
the text and spirit of the CRA, and Section 11.B locates support for the
instructions in court decisions and other commentary.

158. Cf Zimmer, Emerging Uniform Structure, supra note 42, at 604-05 (arguing that the
motivating factor provision has implications beyond mixed-motive claims).
159. See supra notes 42, 51, infra notes 161-162 and accompanying text (discussing the
confusion created by the current division between pretext and mixed-motive cases).
160. Cf. Zimmer, Emerging Uniform Structure, supra note 42, at 603-04 (reaching a
similar conclusion).
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A. Proposed Jury Instructions for Disparate Treatment Employment
Discrimination Cases
This Section argues that a single set of instructions for both pretext
and mixed-motive claims would greatly clarify this muddled area of
the law, and it turns to the language of the CRA for guidance in de
vising these instructions. The Act provides a valuable starting point in
large part because it eschews the direct evidence requirement. Under
current law, a discrimination plaintiff reaches the end of trial unsure
what "direct evidence" means, or at least uncertain whether she meets
the threshold that will satisfy the particular panel she may draw on
appeal.161 Thus faced with the possibility that she will lose her mixed
motive claim for lack of sufficiently direct evidence, the plaintiff re
quests that the jury be instructed under both the mixed-motive and the
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine modes of analysis.1 62
This Section proposes resolving the problem of dual instructions
by jettisoning the division between pretext and mixed-motive in favor
of a single motivating factor test. The Section derives this test largely
from the text of the CRA's motivating factor provision, coupled with
the Act's same-decision provision. Using the CRA as a model, this
Note proposes the following set of instructions for use in disparate
treatment cases:
In light of all of the evidence that has been presented, was the plaintiff's
[protected characteristic] a motivating factor in the defendant's [adverse
employment) decision?
If the defendant was motivated by the plaintiff's [protected characteris

tic], would the defendant have made the same decision even if it had not
considered the plaintiff's [protected characteristic) ?
If you find that the defendant would have made the same decision if it
had not considered the plaintiff's [protected characteristic), I will decide
what kind of relief is equitable to correct the violation of the law. If you
find, however, that the defendant would not have made the same deci
sion, you must also determine [the amount of damages to award).

161. Cf Robyn S. Hankins, Whose Burden Is It, Anyway? The 1 1 th Circuit's Evolving
Standard for "Burden-Shifting" in Employment Discrimination Cases, FLA. BAR J., Mar.
2000, at 58, 62 (concluding, after surveying mixed-motive cases in the Eleventh Circuit, that
"[t]he only real difference between these cases is the panel deciding them"). Hankins's ex
amination of the jurisprudence in this area suggests that the direct evidence standard, at
least in the Eleventh Circuit, "is really no standard at all, akin to the 'I know it when I see it'
standard that has been applied (and misapplied) to pornography for years." Id. at 62 (foot
note omitted).
162. See supra notes 42, 51; cf Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 291 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Courts will also be required to make the often subtle and difficult
distinction between 'direct' and 'indirect' or 'circumstantial' evidence. Lower courts long
have had difficulty applying McDonnell Douglas and Burdine. Addition of a second burden
shifting mechanism . . . is not likely to lend clarity to the process.").
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These instructions take the form of a special verdict, asking the jury to
answer specific questions rather than posing the matter in the legal
framework of "liability" and "damages."
The above instructions depart in a number of ways from the way
most courts approach disparate treatment claims. First, the instruc
tions assume, contrary to the Watson decision,1 63 that the ambiguous
legislative record does not preclude using the CRA's motivating factor
provision
§ 2000e-2(m) - as the standard for all disparate treat
ment claims. The instructions also implement Congress's intent to
render liable all employers who consider an impermissible factor,1 64
and, for reasons explained below, the instructions abandon the direct
evidence requirement. Finally, because the motivating factor provision
serves as the touchstone for the instructions, and because Congress at
tached the same-decision defense to all claims under the motivating
factor provision, the instructions make the same-decision defense
available in all cases.
These instructions implement a number of changes that would aid
jurors in grasping the difficult and complicated issues involved in em
ployment discrimination cases.1 65 Adopting the motivating factor pro
vision as a uniform standard reduces the costs to litigants and courts,
who would no longer struggle with the vagaries of McDonnell
Douglas-Burdine and its enigmatic intersection with mixed-motive
claims. The pretext analysis of McDonnell Douglas-Burdine would
remain relevant, but only insofar as the burden-shifting scheme allows
plaintiffs to show that an impermissible consideration was a motivat
ing factor.
In accordance with the text of the statute and the legislative his
tory, the proposed instructions dispense with Justice O'Connor's di
rect evidence requirement. First, this requirement is not relevant be
cause the text of the statute makes no reference to "direct evidence."
Moreover, it is reasonable to infer from Congress's silence that it did
not intend to codify Justice O'Connor's direct evidence requirement in
mixed-motive cases. The vast number of Congresspersons in 1991
were almost certainly "blissfully unaware"1 66 that direct evidence was
-

1 63. See supra Sections l.B.2 & l.C.2 (discussing the Watson court's dismissal of the pos
sibility that the CRA eliminated the pretext/mixed-motive distinction).
164. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (explaining that the Act overturned
Price Waterhouse to the extent that the decision allowed employers to escape liability alto
gether by succeeding on the same-decision defense).
165. Studies indicate that special verdicts and the use of plain English aid jurors in un
derstanding the instructions. See John L. Breeden, Jr., & William A Bryan, Jr., Improving
Jury Deliberations: Perspectives from the Circuit Court Bench, 12 S.C. LAW., Sept.-Oct. 2000,
at 18, 20, 24 (citing empirical research showing that plain English instructions improve juror
comprehension and suggesting that special verdict forms help j urors recognize the applicable
law).
166. SCALIA, supra note 105, at 32 (stating that, when considering bills, legislators are
often "blissfully unaware" of issues that later spring up in litigation).
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even an issue in the area of mixed-motive discrimination. Most of the
legislators focused their energies on other portions of the Act, and few
likely realized that Justice O'Connor's direct evidence requirement
had become a prerequisite to mixed-motive claims.1 67 Ignorant of the
requirement, then, Congress assuredly did not intend to codify it in the
statute. Similarly, many legislators - few of whom, if any, were em
ployment law experts - may not have realized the differences be
tween the mixed-motive approach they were enacting and the complex
burden-shifting structure of McDonnell Douglas-Burdine. The "in
tent" of the 102nd Congress on this issue, therefore, is opaque at best.
The proposed instructions adhere not only to the CRA's text but
also to its spirit and purpose. The stated aim of the legislation was "to
respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the
scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate pro
tection to victims of discrimination."1 68 The CRA falls in a line of civil
rights laws designed to afford broad protections against discrimina
tion, and courts generally construe such laws in a liberal fashion.1 69
167. See supra notes 140-141 and accompanying text.
168. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3(4), 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
169. Congress itself attempted to codify this canon of liberal construction in the failed
Act of 1990. Section 1107(a) of that legislation read: "All Federal laws protecting the civil
rights of persons shall be interpreted consistent with the intent of such laws, and shall be
broadly construed to effectuate the purpose of such laws to provide equal opportunity and
provide effective remedies." See S. REP. No. 101-315, pt. I, at 4 (1990). Explaining this provi
sion, a Senate Report stated:
Departure from the established rules of statutory construction, such as the rule favoring
broad construction of civil rights laws, interferes with the ability of Congress to express its
will through legislation . . . . When the terms of such a statute are susceptible to several al
ternative interpretations, the courts, consistent with the intent of Congress in enacting that
law, are to select the construction which most effectively advances the underlying congres
sional purpose to provide equal opportunity and to provide effective remedies.
s. REP. No. 101-315, pt. I, at 57-58 (1990).

Although this rule of construction was deleted from the legislation as ultimately enacted,
the CRA's broad sweep nonetheless remains clear. See Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co. ,
31 F.3d 1221, 1235 n.23 (3d Cir. 1994), vacated and remanded, 1 15 S. Ct. 1397 (1995), reaffd
in part, reinstated in part, vacated in part, rem'd, 65 F.3d 1072 (3d Cir. 1995) ("One overriding
lesson the 1991 Act tutors . . . is that Congress was unhappy with the increasingly parsimoni
ous constructions of Title VII. Essentially, Congress forcefully reminded courts of the canon
that Title VII and ADEA, as remedial statutes, are to be construed liberally to promote
their welfare purposes, equality of treatment and employment opportunities."); see also
Zimmer, Pretext and Mixed Motive, supra note 52, at 11. Moreover, the failure of the provi
sion in the 1990 Act regarding liberal statutory construction does not diminish the fact that
other courts and commentators have employed this canon in construing civil rights laws. See
Int'! Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 381 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("The evils against which [Title VII] is aimed are defined
broadly . . . . Accordingly, under longstanding principles of statutory construction, the Act
should 'be given a liberal interpretation . . . .' "); Powell-Ross v. All Star Radio, Inc., No. 951078, 1995 WL 491291, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 1995) ("[D]efendants' narrow reading con
tradicts the well-established liberality with which we are directed to construe [Title VII].");
3A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 74.08 (4th ed. 1992)
("Where employment issues come under the Civil Rights Acts liberal construction is the
rule . . . . ").
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Viewed within the larger context of Title VII, the motivating factor
provision sets a broad standard that affords relief to all victims of dis
crimination who meet its standard, regardless of the type of evidence
they adduce.1 70
Finally, the plain language of the statute in no way suggests that
the motivating factor provision is limited to mixed-motive claims.
Rather, it states simply that "an unlawful employment practice is es
tablished" when the plaintiff shows that his or her protected trait was
a "motivating factor" in the employer's decision.1 71 Reading the statute
on its face and within its broader context, then, the motivating factor
provision creates a uniform motivating factor test that applies in all
disparate treatment cases.
B. Other Attempts to Simplify the Jury's Task
This Note is not the first attempt to reform the pretext/mixed
motive muddle. Courts, practitioners, and other commentators have
sought to alleviate the confusion that two separate instructions create,
but their suggestions have failed to take hold. This Section examines
these efforts and concludes that, while informative, these failed at
tempts are insufficiently grounded in the text of Title VII.
Many of the most cogent calls for reform and substantive sugges
tions for improvement hail from the practitioners and courts who deal
with the law in the trenches. In his concurrence in Miller v. Cigna
Corp. ,172 Judge Greenberg bemoaned that employment discrimination
law is "cursed with elusive terms like 'mixed motives' and 'pretext,' "
and he proposed dispensing with the "unhelpful monikers" alto
gether.1 73 The Judge first examined the Supreme Court's decision in
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,174 concluding that Hazen had abandoned
the notion of an independent category of mixed-motive cases.1 75 Judge
Greenberg also stated that the Hazen Court expressed discomfort with
1 70. See Zimmer, Emerging Uniform Structure, supra note 42, at 600-01.
171. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994).
1 72. 47 F.3d 586, 599 (3d Cir. 1995) (Greenberg, J., concurring).
173. Id.
174. 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993) ("Whatever the employer's decisionmaking process, a dis
parate treatment claim cannot succeed unless the employee's protected trait actually played
a role in that process and had a determinative influence on the outcome."). Biggins, a
sixty-two-year-old terminated employee, alleged that Hazen Paper had violated both the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA'') and the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") when it fired him in order to prevent his pension benefits
from vesting. See id. at 606-07. The Court stated that although an employee's age and his or
her years of experience may correlate, they are "analytically distinct" characteristics. Id. at
611. The Court held that Biggins's benefits were close to vesting because of his years of
service, not because of his age, and that the employer's decision to terminate him because of
his years of service did not, without more, violate the ADEA. Id.
175. Miller, 47 F.3d at 603 (Greenberg, J., concurring).
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Burdine's shifting burdens and presumptions, and indeed with "pre
text" liability in general17 6 - a position he said the Court confirmed in
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks.177 According to Judge Greenberg,
Hicks instructed district courts to employ pretext analysis only insofar
as it, along with other evidence in the record, sheds light on the ulti
mate question: whether intentional discrimination occurred.1 78 Be
cause the Judge understood Hazen as having eliminated a separate
category of mixed-motive cases and Hicks as having dispensed with a
separate class of pretext claims, he concluded that the Court had left
itself with one broad category of disparate treatment cases.1 79
Other courts, like Judge Greenberg, have eliminated the distinc
tion between pretext and mixed-motive cases at the jury instruction
phase. In Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. ,180 the Second Circuit recog
nized the difficulties that the ambiguous direct evidence requirement
ultimately creates during jury instructions. Dismissing the requirement
as an odd fixation by the lower courts on language that was not con
trolling in Price Waterhouse, the Tyler court stated that the jury in
struction simply must comport with the statute.181 The court added that
although McDonnell Douglas, Burdine, and Price Waterhouse are use
ful tools for judges deciding motions for summary judgment,182 they
are not appropriate schemas for jury instructions, in part because they
were laid down before jury trials were available in Title VII cases.183
The Tyler court thus required the plaintiff to establish by a prepon
derance of the evidence, either direct or circumstantial, that the pro176. Id.
177. 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993) (emphasizing that a Title VII plaintiff bears the ultimate
burden of persuasion at all times).
178. Miller, 47 F.3d 586, 605 (Greenberg, J., concurring)
179. Id. at 605-06. Unfortunately, Judge Greenberg dropped a final footnote that seem
ingly reinstated the separate category of mixed-motive cases he declared had been abol
ished. He stated that a "limited category" of Price Waterhouse cases remained intact, ex
plaining that such cases exist where the record shows not only that the employer's motives
were mixed, but also that the plaintiffs evidence is sufficiently direct to shift the burden of
the same-decision defense to the defendant. Id. at 606 & n.4. Judge Greenberg did not ad
dress the CRA of 1991, nor did he examine the roots of the direct evidence requirement he
invoked. It is unclear how his "limited category" of Price Waterhouse cases differs from the
broader category of mixed-motive claims that he purportedly eliminated.
180. 958 F.2d 1 1 76, 1183-85 (2d Cir. 1 992).
1 81. Id. at 1 1 85. The Tyler court dealt with New York's Human Rights Law, but the
state law's language is similar to Title VII, and courts have construed it consistently with
Title VII. Id. at 1180.
182. But see Malamud, supra note 16, at 2279 ("[A]lthough district courts purport to use
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine, the proof structure actually does little to aid their analysis of
the facts at summary judgment. Indeed, in practice courts are left largely to their own de
vices when it comes to determining which factual questions are to be addressed at which
stage of the proof structure.").
183. See Tyler, 958 F.2d at 1 185. The CRA first made jury trials available in Title VII
cases in 1991. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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tected characteristic was a motivating factor in the employer's deci
sion. If the plaintiff discharges his or her burden, the jury then deter
mines whether the employer prevails on its affirmative same-decision
defense.184
The Tyler court noted that the last step of McDonnell Douglas
Burdine - where the plaintiff persuades the trier of fact either that a
discriminatory reason actually motivated the employer or that the em
ployer's proffered explanation is unworthy of belief - is functionally
equivalent to the plaintiff's initial burden under Price Waterhouse.185
The only difference between the two, the court explained, is that the
mixed-motive plaintiff begins by focusing on the discrimination itself,
while the pretext plaintiff begins by focusing on his or her qualifica
tions.186 In other words, the more focused proof of discrimination pre
sented by a mixed-motive plaintiff allows him or her to bypass the
bulk of the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine analysis, but the two modes
of proof ultimately end up in the same place. Since McDonnell
Douglas-Burdine and Price Waterhouse are simply different routes to
the same destination, the Tyler court stated that the two methods of
proof can be boiled down to two central components for the purposes
of jury instructions: (1) the motivating factor test and (2) the same
decision defense.187
Several circuits explicitly recognize the confusion the
pretext/mixed-motive distinction creates for juries and have taken
steps to simplify their jury instructions. The Eighth Circuit's Commit
tee on Model Civil Jury Instructions, for example, adopted Tyler's ap
proach for many types of disparate treatment claims.188 Although the
Committee acknowledged the feasibility of separate instructions for
pretext and mixed-motive claims, it expressed concern with the diffi
culty courts face in attempting to classify a given case.189 As a result,
184. Tyler, 958 F.2d at 1 185.
185. Id.
186. Id. Once a McDonnell Douglas-Burdine plaintiff establishes that she is a member
of a protected class, she first must show that she applied for a position for which she was
qualified. See supra text accompanying note 17.
187. Id. at 1 1 87. Tindall, supra note 52, at 367-68, endorses the approach in Tyler, but he
notes that the test was "short-lived." Indeed, approximately three months after handing
down Tyler, the Second Circuit moved into the animus-plus camp, see supra notes 38-39 and
accompanying text, in Ostrowski v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Companies, 968 F.2d 171 (2d
Cir. 1992). There the court held that, in order for circumstantial evidence to trigger a mixed
motive instruction, the evidence must be "tied directly to the alleged discriminatory ani
mus." Ostrowski, 968 F.2d at 182.
The Tyler instructions look markedly similar to the instructions proposed by Professor
Michael Zimmer. See infra notes 206-210 (summarizing and critiquing Zimmer's proposed
instructions).
188. COMMITTEE ON MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, MANUAL OF MODEL CIVIL
JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 81-89 (1999).
189. Id. at 82.
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the Committee devised a special set of interrogatories to elicit findings
in borderline pretext/mixed-motive cases.190 Despite these interrogato
ries, the distinction remained "cumbersome and potentially confus
ing," and the Committee decided to endorse a motivating factor/same
decision instruction for all disparate treatment claims arising under the
ADEA, § 1981, § 1983, and the motivating factor provision.191 But in
Title VII cases that do not fall under the motivating factor provision
- presumably all pretext claims, or cases with insufficiently direct
evidence - the Committee retained separate pretext instructions.192
The Eleventh Circuit adopted a similar set of model jury instructions
that employ a motivating factor/same-decision test and special inter
rogatories, 193 and the Ninth Circuit adopted motivating factor/same
decision instructions that appear to apply in all disparate treatment
cases.194
Despite the efforts of courts like the Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits, the confusing distinctions remain. As a result, practitioners
and scholars also have tried their hand at streamlining the multifac
eted instructions. Most notably, the American Bar Association's Liti
gation Section attempted to clarify the morass by drawing a distinction
between direct and indirect methods of proof.195 Under this method of
analysis, as in Justice O'Connor's concurrence, the direct method of
proof corresponds with mixed-motive claims, while indirect methods
of proof are associated with pretext claims. The ABA's Model Instruc
tion 1.02[1] charges:
To prevail on a claim of intentional discrimination, the plaintiff must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant had a rea
son or motive to discriminate against [him/her] in the matter before this
court. The plaintiff must prove, either directly or indirectly, that there is
evidence of intentional discrimination.196

190. Id. at 184-89.
191. Id. at 83-84.
192. Id. at 192. For criticism of the Eighth Circuit's blurring of the pretext/mixed-motive
distinction, see Haase, supra note 149.
193. ELEVENTH CIRCUIT COMMITIEE ON PATIERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, PATIERN
JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL CASES) 86-91 (2000) .
194. COMMITIEE ON MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, MANUAL OF MODEL CIVIL
JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT 86 (1999).
195. See EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR RELATIONS LAW COMMITIEE, AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION 11 (1994) [herein
after ABA MODEL INSTRUCTIONS].
196. Id. The instructions explain that:
[d] irect evidence would include oral or written statements showing a discriminatory motiva
tion for the defendant's treatment of the plaintiff. Indirect or circumstantial evidence would
include proof of a set of circumstances that would allow one to reasonably believe that
[race/color/national origin/gender] was a motivating factor in the defendant's treatment of
the plaintiff.
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This instruction seems to apply regardless of the type of evidence ad
duced - a standard simpler even than this Note's proposed standard.
But then the Model Instructions muddy the water. Where the plaintiff
claims her evidence is sufficiently direct, the trial judge reads Instruc
tion 1.02[2], which defines direct evidence as "evidence of remarks or
action that, if believed, directly prove that the plaintiff's [membership
in a protected class] was a factor in the defendant's decision," explic
itly excluding "stray remarks" from the definition.197 Where indirect
evidence is implicated, however, the court reads Instruction 1.02[3],
which delineates the familiar prima facie case of McDonnell Douglas
Burdine.198 Thus, although Instruction 1.02[1] appears simply to ask
whether the defendant intentionally discriminated, the follow-up in
structions quickly cloud matters for the jury. In cases where the plain
tiff presents both direct and indirect evidence, the trial court reads all
three instructions, leaving the jury understandably perplexed. Finally,
the instructions ignore the text of Title VII by neglecting the same
decision defense, which is available to defendants under the portion of
the statute - the motivating factor provision - from which the ABA
borrowed in devising its instructions.
Although the ABA makes a valiant effort, the line between direct
and indirect evidence remains fuzzy, and the subtle differences in the
approaches, as well as the complexity of the prima facie case, befuddle
the jury. Thus, no matter how clearly the court articulates the two
standards, the pretext/mixed-motive distinction inevitably creates con
fusion for the jurors.199 As a result, numerous practitioners, courts, and
Id.
197. Id. at 13. The ABA cites case law from the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits
supporting its definition. Id. (citing Young v. City of Houston, 906 F.2d 1 77 (5th Cir. 1 990);
Merrick v. Farmers Ins. Group, 892 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1 990); Gagne v. Northwestern Nat'I
Ins. Co., 881 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1989); Smith v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 875 F.2d 1325
(7th Cir. 1 989)). But as the foregoing discussion of the circuit split reveals, see supra notes
35-41 and accompanying text, those circuits do not currently agree on any single formulation
of the concept.
1 98. See ABA MODEL INSTRUCrIONS, supra note 1 95, at 17.
1 99. See Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1 1 76, 1185 (2d Cir. 1992) (explaining
that McDonnell Douglas, Burdine, and Price Waterhouse are "useful analytical constructs,"
but that they are not appropriate for jury instructions); LEWIS, supra note 42, at 243; Smith,
supra note 51, at 37; cf Davis, supra note 52, at 706 & n.17 (stating that McDonnell
Douglas's complicated scheme merely "shifts the burden of incomprehensibility to the jury,"
citing the convoluted jury instructions in Lynch v. Belden & Co., 882 F.2d 262, 265-66 (7th
Cir. 1989), as an example).
Some circuits have held that the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine scheme, because of its
complexity, should not be part of the jury charge at all. See Loeb v. Textron, 600 F.2d 1003,
1 016 ( 1 st Cir. 1979) ("McDonnell Douglas was not written as a prospective jury charge; to
read its technical aspects to a jury. . . will add little to the juror's understanding of the case,
and even worse, may lead jurors to abandon their own judgment and to seize upon poorly
understood legalisms to decide the ultimate question of discrimination."); Mullen v. Princess
Anne Volunteer Fire Co., 853 F.2d 1 130, 1 137 (4th Cir. 1988) (criticizing, but upholding as
harmless error, an "overly complex" McDonnell Douglas jury instruction); see also 8TH CIR.
MODEL INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 188, at 86 ("It is unnecessary and inadvisable to instruct
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commentators advocate erasing the bewildering distinction, calling for
a simplification of jury instructions in individual employment dis
crimination cases.200
Many scholars who have examined the problem propose model
jury instructions that would streamline the jury charge and simplify
the confusing nexus of pretext and mixed motive. Professor Kenneth
Davis, for example, states that the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine
scheme's formalism creates evidentiary distortions that defy common
sense.201 He argues that Hicks, in discarding the pretext-only rule,
eliminated any justification for retaining the complex burden-shifting
mechanism, and he therefore advocates jettisoning McDonnell
Douglas-Burdine and replacing it with a motivating factor test.202 Such
a test, he asserts, would allow the parties to focus on the central issues
- intentional discrimination and the same-decision defense - with
out the additional baggage the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine scheme
carries.203
Davis does not provide a sample of his proposed instructions, but it
is reasonable to assume that they would resemble current mixed
motive instructions, which are, under the 1991 Act, based on a moti
vating factor test. One prototype reads:
You have heard evidence that, in terminating Ms. Harding, Acme
Products was motivated by Ms. Harding's gender, by Ms. Harding's fail
ure to get along with her coworkers, and by her contacting a client out
side the scope of her responsibilities.
If you find that the fact that Ms. Harding is a woman was a motivating
factor in Acme Product's decision, then you must find that Acme Prod
ucts is liable for discriminating against Ms. Harding.
If you also find, however, that Acme Products, even though it was mo
tivated in part by Ms. Harding's gender, would have terminated Ms.
Harding anyway for failure to get along with coworkers and/or by con

tacting the client, then you may find liability, but you may not award

the jury regarding the three-step analysis of McDonnell Douglas . . . . ); 9TH CIR. MODEL
INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 194, at 138 ("It is not necessary to instruct the jury regarding the
presumptions and burdens of the McDonnell Douglas framework for considering indirect
evidence of a discriminatory motive."). Indeed, in Hicks the Court stated that the complex
prima facie case "drops out of the picture" once the employer articulates a legitimate, non
discriminatory reason for its action. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510 (1993).
"

200. See, e.g., Miller v. Cigna Corp., 47 F.3d 586, 599 (3d Cir. 1995) (Greenberg, J., con
curring); Tyler, 958 F.2d at 1 185; Zimmer, Pretext and Mixed Motive, supra note 52, at 1 1 ;
Rutherglen, supra note 42, a t 59.
201. Davis, supra note 52, at 761.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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damages. I will decide what kind of relief is equitable to correct the viola

tion of the law.204

This example simplifies matters for the jury, focusing its attention on
the motivating factor and same-decision tests. And because it is de
rived from the text of the CRA, the example closely resembles this
Note's proposed instructions. But these instructions are designed only
for mixed-motive cases, and they do not accommodate pretext plain
tiffs who do not offer direct evidence, whatever that may be.
Other proposed instructions attempt to adhere to this formula
without entirely jettisoning the distinctions between pretext and
mixed-motive claims and direct and circumstantial evidence. Professor
Michael Zimmer offers a hybrid method of instructing the jury that
draws upon both the ABA's Model Instructions and the motivating
factor test common in mixed-motive cases.205 Where the plaintiff's case
involves evidence that could be considered both direct and indirect,
Zimmer proposes that the trial court first instruct the jury to decide
whether the evidence does indeed constitute direct evidence of the de
fendant's intent to discriminate.206 Next the court tells the jury to con
sider all of the circumstantial evidence presented by either party. The
jury then must decide, based on all of the evidence, whether the pro
tected characteristic was a "motivating factor" in the employer's deci
sion.20 7 If the jury finds that the protected trait was a motivating factor,
the plaintiff has carried her burden of proving a violation, and the de
fendant is liable even if the jury accepts the defendant's legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action.208
Professor Zimmer's approach seems on its face to retain the dis
tinction between direct and indirect evidence while presenting the dis
tinction to the jury in a comprehensible fashion. In the end, however,
Zimmer in fact adopts nothing more than the motivating factor test
associated with mixed-motive claims under the CRA, which most
courts apply only in cases involving direct evidence. The distinction
between direct and indirect evidence serves no purpose in Zimmer's
scheme, because the essential inquiry for the jury is the ultimate ques
tion: whether the plaintiff's protected characteristic was a motivating
factor. Whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial ultimately
makes no difference, because the jury simply determines, based on all
of the evidence, whether the impermissible criterion was a motivating
factor. Since the "directness" of the evidence is therefore irrelevant,
204. 2 HENRY H. PERRITI, JR., CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE WORKPLACE 88 (1995) (footnote
omitted).
205. See Zimmer, Pretext and Mixed Motive, supra note 52, at 38.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
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Zimmer's discussion of the distinction is mere surplusage that only
confuses the jury.
Despite its shortcomings, Zimmer's approach improves upon cur
rent jury instructions because it focuses on the ultimate question: the
motives of the employer. This Note goes a step beyond Zimmer209 and a step farther away from case law in the Supreme Court and lower
courts - in proposing instructions drawn directly from the text of the
CRA.210 The motivating factor standard employed in this Note is supe
rior to the standards suggested by other scholars not only because of
its fidelity to congressional language, but also because it simplifies a
complex area of the law that currently puzzles judges, lawyers, juries,
and parties alike.
CONCLUSION

This Note demonstrates that the confusion among the lower courts
over the direct evidence requirement in mixed-motive employment
discrimination cases has infected the entirety of individual disparate
treatment law. Faced with a requirement of dubious origins and hap
hazard application, mixed-motive plaintiffs reach to the complex struc
ture of McDonnell Douglas-Burdine in order to cover their bases. But
this sweeping approach only passes the buck to jurors, who are far less
equipped to make sense of this area of law than plaintiffs' attorneys
and the courts. The surest way to clear this mess is not to clarify the
meaning of direct evidence, but rather to simplify the system alto
gether.
This Note suggests that the pretext and mixed-motive methods of
proof can be streamlined into a single standard that simply asks
whether the plaintiff's protected characteristic was a motivating factor
in the defendant's employment decision. If the plaintiff can satisfy his
or her motivating factor burden, the defendant is liable under the
plain terms of the motivating factor provision. The defendant may
then minimize its damages by proving that it would have made the
same employment decision absent the impermissible consideration.
209. Elsewhere Professor Zimmer, like this Note, has urged a straightforward applica
tion of the motivating factor provision to all disparate treatment claims brought under Title
VII. See Zimmer, Emerging Uniform Structure, supra note 42. But in that article Zimmer
did not propose a set of j ury instructions, nor did he engage in the rigorous textual and leg
islative history analysis that is central to this Note.
210. But as Tyler illustrates, see supra notes 180-187 and accompanying text, the instruc
tions are not entirely without support among the lower courts. In addition, other commenta
tors have suggested simplifying the complexities of disparate treatment law by focusing on
the ultimate issue of discrimination, without regard to the distinction between pretext and
mixed-motive. For example, Malamud, supra note 16, at 2317-18, advocates an open-ended
standard that dispenses with McDonnell Douglas-Burdine altogether and that focuses in
stead on whether the plaintiff has proven intentional discrimination by a preponderance of
the evidence.
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Adopting this proof framework would allow parties to structure their
behavior according to a plain, articulable standard, thereby benefiting
both sides of employment discrimination suits.

